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Deixis and Fictional Minds 
 




In this essay I show how marked patterns in the use of deictic expressions in literary texts can 
contribute to the projection of fictional minds that appear to work in “nonstandard” or 
“unorthodox” ways. More specifically, I suggest that the inherent “egocentricity” of deictic 
expressions can be exploited to represent strikingly “egocentric” fictional minds. I discuss in 
detail two examples from different genres: the poetic persona in Ted Hughes’s poem 
“Wodwo”, and the first-person narrator in Mark Haddon’s novel The Curious Incident of the 
Dog in the Night-Time. In each case, I point out the presence of patterns in the use of deictic 
expressions that can be described as idiosyncratic, and I argue that these patterns interact with 
other textual phenomena to contribute to the impression of a fictional mind that works in a 
striking and distinctive way. My claims about the idiosyncratic use of certain types of deictic 
expressions in the two texts are supported by automatic quantitative comparisons with 
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In this essay I show how marked patterns in the use of deictic expressions in literary texts 
(e.g. “I”, “you”, “this”, “that”) can contribute to the projection of fictional minds that appear 
to work in “nonstandard” or “unorthodox” ways (see Leech and Short, Margolin). More 
specifically, I suggest that the inherent “egocentricity” of deictic expressions can be exploited 
to represent strikingly “egocentric” fictional minds. I begin by locating this study against the 
background of recent work on fictional minds in narratology and on mind style in literary 
stylistics. I then discuss in detail two examples from different genres: the poetic persona in 
Ted Hughes’s poem “Wodwo” and the first-person narrator in Mark Haddon’s novel The 
Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time. In each case, I point out the presence of 
patterns in the use of deictic expressions that can be described as idiosyncratic, and I argue 
that these patterns interact with other textual phenomena to contribute to the impression of a 
fictional mind that works in a striking and peculiar way. The creation of such minds is an 
important part of the significance and distinctiveness of both texts. My claims about the 
idiosyncratic use of certain types of deictic expressions in the two texts are supported by 
quantitative comparisons with relevant larger corpora conducted by means of the online 




The notions of “consciousness”, “mind” and “mental functioning” have recently come to 
occupy centre stage in narratology, and particularly in the work of narratologists who draw 
from cognitive science in order to account for the characteristics and comprehension of 
fictional narratives (e.g. Herman D., Zunshine). Fludernik has proposed that the essential 
characteristic of narrative is not the presence of a plot, but the presence of the consciousness 
of an anthropomorphic protagonist, through which actions and events are filtered (see also 
Lodge). More specifically, Fludernik defines “narrativity” in terms of “experientiality”, 




since humans are conscious thinking beings, (narrative) experientiality always implies 
– and sometimes emphatically foregrounds – the protagonist’s consciousness. 
Narrativity can emerge from the experiential portrayal of dynamic event sequences 
which are already configured emotively and evaluatively, but it can also consist in the 
experiential depiction of human consciousness tout court. (Fludernik 22) 
 
In Fictional Minds, Palmer has boldly stated that “narrative fiction is, in essence, the 
presentation of fictional mental functioning”, and hence that the study of the novel “is the 
study of fictional mental functioning” (Palmer, Fictional Minds 5). Palmer adopts a broad 
definition of “mind,” which includes emotions, beliefs and dispositions as well as cognition 
and perception (Fictional Minds 19). More importantly, Palmer has drawn attention to 
phenomena that had traditionally been neglected in the study of narrative fiction, notably the 
presence of a wider range of textual indications of mental functioning than is captured by 
traditional accounts of thought presentation, and the tendency for much fictional mental 
functioning to be socially shared or “intermental”, rather than individual or “intramental” (see 
also Palmer, Social Minds in the Novel).    
 
Margolin similarly argues that, in order to make sense of fictional narratives, readers or 
listeners have to attribute to characters human or human-like “cognitive mental functioning”. 
In addition, Margolin points out that literature often explores fictional mental functioning 
beyond what is conventionally regarded as “normal”: 
 
What is probably even more significant is the preference of much literature for 
nonstandard forms of cognitive functioning, be they rare or marginal, deviant, or 
involving a failure, breakdown, or lack of standard patterns. (Margolin 287) 
 
In literary stylistics, similar observations have been made by scholars who have studied the 
variety of linguistic patterns that contribute to the projection of the distinctive “mind styles” 
of characters, narrators or authors. The notion of “mind style” was originally introduced by 
Fowler (Linguistics and the Novel): 
 
We may coin the term “mind style” to refer to any distinctive linguistic representation 
of an individual mental self. (Fowler, Linguistics and the Novel 103) 
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Cumulatively, consistent structural options, agreeing in cutting the presented world to 
one pattern or another, give rise to an impression of a world view, what I shall call a 
“mind style”. (Fowler, Linguistics and the Novel 76) 
 
Leech and Short subsequently proposed a cline from “normal”, “natural”, “uncontrived” 
mind styles at one end, to, at the other end, “unusual” mind styles, “which clearly impose an 
unorthodox conception of the fictional world” (Leech and Short 151, 188-189). By and large, 
studies of mind style tend to focus on narrators and characters that fall at the “unorthodox” 
end of the scale, such as, for example, Lok in Golding’s The Inheritors (Halliday “Literary 
Style”, Leech and Short, Fowler, Linguistic Criticism), Benjy in Faulkner’s The Sound and 
the Fury (Leech and Short, Fowler, Linguistic Criticism), and Bromden in Kesey’s One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (Semino and Swindlehurst).  
 
Boase-Beier suggests that what characterizes the notion of mind style is “a consistent stylistic 
pattern in the text as evidence of a particular cognitive state” (Boase-Beier 263-4), and 
applies the concept to the analysis of poetry and its translation. Boase-Beier is particularly 
concerned with authorial mind styles, but recognizes that “in speaking of the poet we mean 
an implied poet, who, like Booth’s ‘implied author,’ is recreated by the reader from the 
textual evidence’ (Boase-Beier 255). This is consistent with the view, expressed for example 
by Easthope and Vimala Herman, that poetic voices are best seen as textual constructs, which 
arise in the interaction between readers and texts.  
 
Within both the narratological and stylistics traditions, it has been pointed out that the 
presentation of the workings of minds that are perceived as unusual can lead to a 
reassessment, on the reader’s part, of what it means to be “normal”. Margolin for example, 
has suggested that the presentation of the “breakdown and failure” of cognitive mechanisms 
in fiction “is itself a powerful cognitive tool which may make us aware of actual cognitive 
mechanisms, and, more specifically, of our own mental functioning” (Margolin 278). 
Similarly, Leech and Short have pointed out that the language used in the Sound and the Fury 
to convey Benjy’s “childlike vision”, “borders on poetry in recapturing a pristine awareness 
of things” (Leech and Short 166). In other words, the presentation of nonstandard mental 
functioning, or of unusual mind styles, can have a “deautomatizing” or “schema refreshing” 
effect on readers (Shklovsky, Cook), who are exposed to ways of making sense of experience 
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that they perceive as different from their own, and hence have the opportunity to consider 
afresh their understanding of the world and of “normality” (see also Draaisma). 
 
Within the tradition in the study of mind style that goes back to Fowler’s work, a variety of 
types of linguistic patterns have been shown to be relevant to the projection of distinctive 
mind styles. These include patterns of choice in terms of: vocabulary (e.g. Leech and Short, 
Fowler, Linguistic Criticism), grammar (e.g. Leech and Short, Fowler, Linguistic Criticism), 
transitivity (e.g. Halliday “Literary Style”, Fowler Linguistic Criticism), speech 
representation (e.g. Bockting), metaphor (e.g. Semino and Swindlehurst, Semino “A 
cognitive stylistic approach”, Metaphor in Discourse), and conversational behaviour (Fanlo 
Piniés, Semino, “Mind Style 25 years on”). The potential role of patterns of deictic choices in 
the projection of mind style has not received systematic attention, but Bockting has pointed 
out how the mind styles of the Compson brothers in Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury are 
conveyed, in part, by peculiarities in the use of deixis in their individual narratives. I will 




The notion of “deixis”, which etymologically derives from the Greek word for “pointing”, 
applies to linguistic expressions (e.g. “I”, “this”, “here”, “now”) that refer to entities and 
spatial or temporal locations from a particular subjective position, normally that of the 
producer of the text in the situational context in which the text is being produced. Lyons 
defines deixis as follows:  
 
By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, 
processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the 
spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the 
participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee. (Lyons  
637) 
 
In face-to-face interaction, which Lyons describes as the “canonical situation of utterance”, 
deictic expressions typically take the speaker’s position as their point of anchorage, and 
hence can only be successfully interpreted with reference to that position. This applies, for 
example, to the interpretation of “here” in the utterance “If you stand here you can see the top 
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of the church tower”. In this utterance “here” refers to the specific point where the speaker is 
standing, and the addressee needs to be aware of this position in order fully to interpret what 
the speaker is saying. Deixis is often described as “egocentric” precisely because, typically, 
“the ego of the encoder represents the center of orientation” (Rauh 12). This point of 
orientation has also been referred to as the default “deictic centre”, “zero point” or “origo” 
(see Lyons, Bühler, Levinson).  
 
Deixis involves a (subjective) distinction between what is perceived as “proximal” to the 
deictic centre and what is perceived as “non-proximal” or “distal”. This is clearly evident in 
what is arguably the most prototypical dimension of deixis, namely space deixis. Space deixis 
involves references to locations in terms of their perceived position in relation to the deictic 
centre. The main contrast, in present-day English, is that between proximal deictic 
expressions such as “this” and “here”, which refer to locations that are perceived as close to 
the deictic centre, and non-proximal expressions such as “that” and “there” which refer to 
locations that are perceived as far from that position. The perception of proximity is 
subjective and context-dependent. For example, “here” typically includes the speaker’s 
position, but can vary quite dramatically in terms of how wide an area it refers to around that 
position. While in the example above “here” only refers to the few square centimeters in 
which the speaker is standing, much larger areas are referred to as “here” in utterances such 
as “It doesn’t rain much here” or “We drive on the left side of the road here”. Space deixis 
also include the use of the motion verbs “come” and “go” to indicate, respectively, movement 
towards the deictic centre and movement away from the deictic centre. 
 
In addition to space deixis, this essay will be concerned primarily with two further deictic 
dimensions, namely time and person deixis. Time deixis involves the expression of a contrast 
between “now” and “not-now” or “then”, and includes expressions such as “now”, “then”, 
“later”, “today”, “yesterday”, “tomorrow”, “ago”. Tense contrasts are also deictic, as they 
grammaticalize “the relationship which holds between the time of the situation that is being 
described and the temporal zero-point of the deictic context” (Lyons 678). The temporal 
deictic use of “this” and “that” in expressions such as “this month” or “that day” arguably 
involves a metaphorical extension to time of the spatial distinction between “here” and “not-
here/there” (see also Lenz). Person deixis, on the other hand,  involves references to the roles 
of addresser and addressee in communication, and includes, in English, the first and second-
person pronouns “I”, “we” and “you”. In fact, the pronoun “I” is one of the most prototypical 
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cases of deictic expressions, as it normally refers to whoever is currently speaking or writing, 
so that its referent changes with every change of speaker/writer. Space, time, and person 
deixis are normally described as the main types of deictic phenomena (e.g. Lyons, Fillmore, 
Levinson). The linguistic expression of a range of further phenomena has also been described 
as involving deictic contrasts. These include for example, references to portions of a text or 
utterance from the current point in the ongoing text or talk (“discourse deixis”), references to 
the rank or social status of other people from the speaker’s/writer’s own position in a family, 
institution, or society (“social deixis”), and the use of expressions such as “this” and “that” to 
express emotional distance (“empathetic deixis”) (see Lyons, Fillmore, Levinson, Rauh ). 
 
While the speaker’s or writer’s here-and-now constitutes the unmarked deictic centre, there 
are many instances and forms of communication where a different position in space and time 
is adopted as the zero-point for the use of deictic expressions. Consider, for example, the 
question “Are you coming to the cinema tonight?”, which may be uttered in a telephone 
conversation between two people currently in their respective homes. The use of “come”, in 
this case, indicates movement towards the location in which the speaker expects to be later 
that day, and towards which s/he is hoping the addressee will also travel. This phenomenon, 
which is known as “deictic projection” (Lyons, Levinson ), is well-recognized in a variety of 
forms of communication, but is particularly relevant for the study of deixis in fiction, where 
the deictic centre typically corresponds to the position of a narrator or character within an 
imaginary situational context. In a classic early study of deixis, Bühler introduced the notion 
of “deixis at phantasma” to capture the use of deictic expressions to refer to elements of a 
situational context that is different from the current communicative situation, and not directly 
perceivable by the listener or reader. Bühler says that in such cases, 
 
the narrator takes the listener into the realm of the memorable absent, or fully into the 
realm of constructive imagination, treating him there to the same deictic words that he 
may see and hear what is there to be seen and heard (and to be touched or perhaps 
even smelled or tasted). Not with the outward eye, ear, etc. but with what, in contrast, 
is conventionally called the “inner” or the “mind’s eye or ear in everyday language 
[…]. (Bühler 22) 
 
In other words, in fiction as well as in many other cases of deictic projection, the use of 
deictic expressions does not rely on the addressee’s awareness of the speaker’s position and 
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perspective, but rather provides clues for the construction of a subjective position within an 
imagined situational context in reference to which the deictic expressions used in the text 
make sense (see also Green, Semino “Deixis and the Dynamics”). Indeed, deixis plays a 
central role in accounts of the textual projection of point of view (e.g. Fowler, Linguistic 
Criticism, Short), as well in models of narrative comprehension that attempt to account for 
how readers imagine text worlds by navigating through changes of time and place (e.g. 
Duchan et al., Emmott, Fauconnier, Werth, Gavins). The mental representations of situations 
that we form as we read a narrative tend to be defined primarily in deictic terms, whether they 
are labelled “mental spaces” (Fauconnier), “sub-worlds” (Werth), or “contextual frames” 
(Emmott). More specifically, deictics are among the linguistic expressions that may be used 
to indicate shifts from one mental space, sub-world or contextual frame to another (see also 
Gavins’s notion of “world switches”).  
 
As I mentioned earlier, Bockting has discussed deixis in relation to the textual projection of 
characters’ minds and personalities. She argues, for example, that, in Faulkner’s The Sound 
and the Fury, the impression of Benjy’s limited cognitive abilities is reinforced by the fact 
that he does not seem able to engage in deictic projection, or, in other words, to understand 
others’ perspectives and points of view. In contrast, the attribution of schizophrenia to 
Quentin is in part based on stretches of text in which there is no stability of deictic centre, 
resulting in what Bockting calls a “breakdown of the deictic system” (Bockting 70). In the 
rest of the essay, I discuss in detail the peculiar uses of deixis in Hughes’s “Wodwo” and 
Haddon’s The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time, and their implications for the 
textual projection of the protagonists’ minds. 
Deixis and the poetic persona’s mind in Ted Hughes’s “Wodwo” 
 
Ted Hughes’s poem “Wodwo” first appeared in 1967, as the last poem in the collection of the 








   Wodwo 
 
What am I? Nosing here, turning leaves over 
Following a faint stain on the air to the river’s edge 
I enter water. Who am I to split 
The glassy grain of water looking upward I see the bed 
5 Of the river above me upside down very clear 
What am I doing here in mid-air? Why do I find 
this frog so interesting as I inspect its most secret 
interior and make it my own? Do these weeds 
know me and name me to each other have they 
10  seen me before do I fit in their world? I seem 
separate from the ground and not rooted but dropped 
out of nothing casually I’ve no threads 
fastening me to anything I can go anywhere 
I seem to have been given the freedom 
15 of this place what am I then? And picking 
bits of bark off this rotten stump gives me 
no pleasure and it’s no use so why do I do it 
me and doing that have coincided very queerly 
But what shall I be called am I the first 
20 have I an owner what shape am I what 
shape am I am I huge if I go 
to the end on this way past these trees and past these trees 
till I get tired that’s touching one wall of me 
for the moment if I sit still how everything 
25 stops to watch me I suppose I am the exact centre 
but there’s all this what is it roots 
roots roots roots and here’s the water 




The title of the poem is derived from the Middle English poem Sir Gawain and the Green 
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Knight, where wodwos are among the wild creatures of the forest that are fought by the 
knight during his journey through the Wirrall. Hughes himself described the first-person 
speaker in the poem as:  
 
some sort of satyr or half-man or half-animal, half all kinds of elemental little things, 
just a little larval being without shape or qualities who suddenly finds himself alive in 
this world at any time. (quoted in Sagar The Art of Ted Hughes 98).  
 
Critics variously describe the wodwo as a “wood sprite” (Scigaj 128) or a “proto-human” 
(Holmes 131), as representing the experience of the child, or the poet’s way of exploring 
reality (Sagar, The Art of Ted Hughes 97, “Fourfold vision” 297; see also Bassnett 23). In my 
own reading of the poem, the poetic speaker is a creature who has just made the transition to 
consciousness, which leads to the question that opens the poem: “What am I?”. Indeed, there 
is, broadly speaking, consensus among the critics that the poem is concerned with identity, 
consciousness, knowledge, freedom, and the relationship between the self and the world. 
Hughes’s choice of the wodwo as the poem’s voice and protagonist is both sufficiently 
precise and sufficiently elusive to thwart any attempt to approach the poem as a riddle, but 
also allows readers to see the wodwo as potentially representing any conscious creature who 
is preoccupied with its own uncertain identity and place in the world. In what follows I 
suggest that the use of deixis interacts with other aspects of the poem in order to convey a 
sense of disorientation and lack of boundaries, and to create the impression of the workings 
of a mind that can be described as, in some respects, primitive, and very strongly self-
focused. I begin with some general comments on what I see as the most salient aspects of the 
poem and then I focus on deixis in more detail. 
 
In Tsur’s terms, understanding the poem involves “delayed” (as opposed to “rapid”) 
categorisation, as the Wodwo cannot be straightforwardly identified as a member of a pre-
existing, familiar category: it seems able to fly, swim and move on land; in lines 6-8, it is not 
clear whether it dismembers and eats the frog, or whether it is small enough to move inside 
the frog’s body; similarly, in lines 26-27, it is not clear whether it is on the ground or below 
ground when it comes across what it describes as “roots / roots roots roots”. Readers may of 
course vary in the extent to which they accept the impossibility of establishing precisely the 
characteristics of the wodwo, and in whether they experience this elusiveness as a source of 




A number of linguistic characteristics of the poem are likely to contribute to an overall 
impression of fast and erratic movement, uncertain boundaries and disorientation. The poem 
is written in highly irregular free verse: there are no divisions into stanzas, no regularity in 
line lengths, no discernible metrical pattern, no rhyme scheme, and many instances of 
enjambment (e.g. “have they / seen me”, in lines 9-10). Punctuation is used sparingly in the 
first half of the poem (primarily in the form of question marks) and disappears completely 
after line 15. In addition, no capital letters are used in the final nine lines of the poem except 
for the first-person singular pronoun “I”. This makes it difficult to establish boundaries 
between different clauses and sentences, and contributes to a sense of rapid and increasingly 
anxious, almost breathless movement. Towards the end of the poem, the grammatical 
structure of the wodwo’s monologue becomes increasingly fragmented, so that it would not 
be possible simply to insert punctuation and capital letters to produce a series of well-formed 
sentences (e.g. line 23: “till I get tired that’s touching one wall of me”).  
 
Although the poem consists of only 28 lines and 262 words, it contains 11 questions. The 
wodwo’s concern with its own identity is evident from the opening question “What am I?”. 
The same question occurs again in line 15, and is rephrased as “Who am I” in line 3. In 
addition, the wodwo wonders about: 
• its shape and size in lines 20-21: “what/ shape am I am I huge”; 
• its name in lines 8-9 and 19: “Do these weeds/ […] name me to each other”, “what shall I 
be called”; 
• the reasons for its actions and reactions in lines 6-8 and 15-17: “What am I doing here in 
mid-air? Why do I find/ this frog so interesting”, “picking/ bits of bark off this rotten 
stump gives me/ no pleasure and it’s no use so why do I do it”; 
• its status as “the first” and the existence of an owner in lines 19-20: “am I the first / have I 
an owner”. 
 
Cumulatively, I would argue, the wodwo’s questions seem to suggest a transition from lack 
of consciousness to consciousness, and from instinctive to intentional behaviour. This 
transition raises questions of identity and relationships that the wodwo cannot answer. There 
are several references to lack of roots and physical ties in the poem (lines 10-15, 26-27), 
which can be interpreted metaphorically as suggesting both freedom and a lack of a clear 
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sense of origin and belonging. The poem ends with the decision to “go on looking” and no 
full stop, suggesting that the search for an answer to the wodwo’s questions has not yet been 
successful but is continuing. 
 
Deixis in the poem 
In this section I show how the poem has an unusually high frequency of deictic expressions, 
and that these expressions overwhelmingly express “proximal” as opposed to “distal” 
relationships in terms of person, space and time deixis. This, I suggest, contributes to the 
impression of a mind that seems unable to go beyond its own current subjective position in 
the here-and-now, and to distinguish between “here” and “there”, “now” and “then”, and 
“me” and a possible “you”.  
 
To begin with person deixis, the poem contains 35 occurrences of the first-person singular 
pronouns “I” and “me” out of 262 words (26 instances of “I” and 9 instances of “me”). This 
corresponds to 13 per cent of the words in the poem. An automatic comparison between the 
poem and two larger corpora of fiction confirms that this is an unusually high frequency of 
first-person singular pronouns. I used the keyword tool within the online corpus-comparison 
software Wmatrix (http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/) to compare word frequencies in the 
poem with those in the “Imaginative Writing” section of the British National Corpus Sampler 
(hereafter BNC Sampler) , which contains approximately 233,000 words. The output of the 
tool is a list of words in the text under analysis, starting with those that are “overused” to the 
highest level of statistical significance as opposed to the larger reference corpus. In corpus 
linguistics, the words that are overused to a statistically significant extent in a particular set of 
data as compared with a relevant larger corpus are known as “key words”. An appropriate 
level of statistical significance for this kind of comparison is 99 per cent, which corresponds 
to p < 0.01 and a log-likelihood value1 of 6.63 or above. The top four key words in the poem 
are: “am”, “I”, “roots”, “me”. In each case the result is statistically significant at 99.99 per 
cent (p < 0.0001). The same four words were also found to be the most overused lexical items 
at the same level of statistical significance in a second comparison of the poem with a smaller 
40,000-word corpus of first-person fiction, which was originally compiled as part of a project 
                                                
1 The log-likelihood ratio is a widely used method for calculating statistical significance in corpus linguistics, as 
it does not assume normal distribution (see Dunning 1993). In the output of the Wmatrix keyword tool statistical 
significance is expressed in terms of log-likelihood values. In the rest of this paper I will translate  the relevant 
values into percentages and probability values (p-values), as these have wider currency as expressions of 
degrees of statistical significance. 
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on speech, writing and thought presentation in 20th century British narratives (see Semino and 
Short). In contrast, the poem contains no instances of second-person pronouns: although there 
are many interrogative structures, the wodwo’s questions appear to be instances of self-
address, with no explicit references to a potential addressee. 
 
I now consider spatial and temporal deixis in turn. The poem contains 11 instances of 
proximal space deixis: 3 instances of “here”, 5 instances of “this”, and 3 instances of “these”. 
Together, these account for approximately 4 per cent of the words in the poem. According to 
my keyword analysis, all three words are overused in the poem (at a statistical significance 
level of 99 per cent or above) as compared with both the Imaginative Writing section of the 
BNC Sampler and the first-person fiction corpus. The poem contains only two potential 
instances of distal deixis, namely “go” in line 21 and “that” in line 23. However, the 
fragmented grammatical structure of line 23 makes it difficult to decide whether “that” is 
used as a relative pronoun or as a demonstrative pronoun. Either way, it refers to something 
that is in fact described as “touching” the wodwo’s body. Similarly, the verb “go” in line 21, 
which refers to movement away from the speaker’s position, is followed by “on this way”, 
where the use of the proximal space deixis “this” indicates a focus on the wodwo’s current 
position. 
 
As for time deixis, the poem contains no temporal deictic adverbs, but the use of tense is 
worthy of note. All finite verbs in the poem are in the simple present tense (e.g. “am”, “find”, 
“suppose”), apart from one instance of the present perfect (“have coincided”) and one present 
continuous (“that’s touching”). There are, in other words, no instances of past tense verbs.  
 
To summarize my observations so far, all instances of person and time deixis in the poem 
express proximal deictic relationships. Of the 13 instances of space deixis, 11 are proximal 
deictics; both the remaining two (“go” and “that”) refer to entities and locations that are 
further described as being close to the speaker (and, as I mentioned earlier, the deictic status 
of “that” in line 23 is not clear). Five of the proximal person and space deictics (“I”, “me”, 
“here”, “this” and “these”) are overused to a statistically significant extent as compared with 
two corpora of contemporary fiction. In other words, the use of deixis in the poem suggests 
an exclusive focus on the self and its immediate environment, with no clear evidence of an 
opposition between “here” vs. “there” and “now” vs. “then”, nor of any attempt to engage 




There are, however, points in the poem where it can be argued that the use of distal deixis 
would have been appropriate. Consider, for example, lines 1-3:  
 
[…] Nosing here, turning leaves over 
Following a faint stain on the air to the river’s edge 
I enter water. […] 
 
I regularly ask students in my classes whether the location referred to as “here” in the first 
line of the extract is the same location in which the wodwo “enter(s) water” in the third line 
of the quotation. The answer is always “no”: students tend to point out that the intervening 
non-finite clauses suggest movement in both space and time, so that the wodwo reaches the 
water at a different point from that referred to by “here”. However, the use of a series of three 
non-finite clauses, with no temporal conjunctions, makes it possible for the poetic speaker to 
provide a moment-by-moment account of its movements without using distal deixis of space 
or time. This makes it difficult to establish boundaries between different times and locations 
in the series of actions described in the poem, and contributes to the potential sense of rapid, 
fluid and partly confused movement that may also result from the infrequent use of 
punctuation and by the lack of clear grammatical boundaries, especially in the second half of 
the poem. Compare, for example, the following two (inevitably inadequate) re-writings of the 
above three lines with the original version: 
 
After nosing there, turning leaves over 
And following a faint stain on the air to the river’s edge 
I enter water. 
 
I nosed there, turned leaves over, 
Followed a faint stain on the air to the river’s edge 
And now I enter water. 
 
Both alternative versions of Hughes’s original lines refer to the same sequence of actions, but 
the temporal and spatial separation between them is made explicit by the use of distal deixis 
of space (“there”) and time (“nosed”, “turned”, “followed”). This results in the establishment 
of a distinction between here-and-now and there-and-then. In contrast, in Hughes’s poem the 
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sequence of the wodwo’s actions is presented as a series of here-and-now’s, some of which 
seem to be extremely brief, as in the lines 21-22:   
 
[…] if I go 
to the end on this way past these trees and past these trees 
 
According to my students’ responses to these lines (as well as my own), the two instances of 
“these trees” in the quotation above refer to different groups of trees. When invited to 
rephrase the second line of the above quotation in a way that they perceive as less unusual, 
my students tend to suggest “past those trees and past these trees”. This alternative version 
suggests that the wodwo perceives one group of trees as close to its own position and the 
other as not close to its own position. In the original version, however, the wodwo describes 
each set of trees from a position from which they are perceived as close. This is likely to be 
interpreted as due to the speed at which the wodwo travels, so that by the time it utters (or 
thinks) the second occurrence of “these trees” it has moved from one location to another, and 
from being close to one group of trees to another. In other words, this extract from the poem 
is consistent with the previous one in terms of the presentation of the wodwo’s experience of 
the world as a rapid series of here-and-now’s, with no time, and possibly no ability, to reflect 
on moments in time and locations in space that are perceived as “not here” and “not now”: 
the words of the wodwo’s monologue appear to be entirely simultaneous with its immediate 
actions, movements and reflections. 
 
Overall, my proposal is that the distinctive use of deixis in the poem contributes to the 
projection of a mind that can be described as highly “egocentric” in the sense that it is 
focused on the self in the here-and-now, and does not seem to possess the ability to 
distinguish between what is proximal as opposed to distal in space and time, nor to perceive 
the other as a potential addressee. This is particularly consistent with those readings of the 
poem where the wodwo is a “proto-human” or a partly child-like creature, and with my own 
interpretation of the wodwo as having just acquired consciousness: the ability to conceive of 
places and times other than one’s location in the present, and of others as possessing separate 
minds and perspectives with which to engage, are complex and sophisticated human 
characteristics that are acquired gradually in the course of individual development. 
Interestingly, in line 25 the wodwo draws the following conclusion from its impression that 




 […] I suppose I am the exact centre.  
 
Scigaj (146) comments that as “‘exact centre’ of existence-for-the-self the Wodwo is the 
generator, the creator of its own universe, moment by moment”. I have suggested that the use 
of deixis in the poem contributes to this impression of focus on the self and of “moment-by-
moment cognition” (Scigaj 152). I will now turn to the role of deixis in the projection of a 
different kind of “egocentric” fictional mind in a novel. 
 
Deixis and the first-person narrator’s mind in Mark Haddon’s The Curious Incident of 
the Dog in the Night-Time  
 
Mark Haddon’s novel The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (hereafter The 
Curious Incident) appeared in 2003. It is part of growing trends in both “crossover fiction” (it 
was published in two different covers for adults and children) and in the fictional 
representation of characters with autistic-spectrum disorders (see Walsh, Greenwell, 
Draaisma). The protagonist and first-person narrator, Christopher Boone, is fifteen years old, 
and is normally described (including on the book’s back cover) as being autistic, and 
specifically as being affected by Asperger’s syndrome, a form of high-functioning autism. 
The novel has won several literary prizes (e.g. the 2003 Whitbread Book of the Year), and 
has been widely acclaimed for the moving and “realistic” representation of the first-person 
narrator. Haddon himself has repeatedly stated that he has no specialist knowledge of autistic-
spectrum disorders, and that he did not intend to write a novel about autism or Asperger’s 
syndrome. Rather he states that: 
 
if anything it’s a novel about difference, about being an outsider, about seeing the 
world in a surprising and revealing way. it’s as much a novel about us as it is about 
christopher. (spellings as in original, from the author’s blog: 
http://www.markhaddon.com/aspergers-and-autism, accessed November 2010) 
 
Indeed, the words “Asperger” and “autism” do not occur in the novel, but the reader is 
provided with different sources of evidence that lead to the inference that the narrator and 
protagonist has an autistic-spectrum disorder. Christopher describes himself as “someone 
who has Behavioural Problems” (Haddon 59), and goes to a special school, alongside 
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children with a range of disabilities. He does not tolerate physical contact, is unusually fond 
of routine, has trouble sleeping at night, finds it difficult to communicate with other people, 
and is exceptionally talented in Maths.  Christopher is also a very self-conscious narrator, 
who makes many meta-narrative and meta-linguistic comments (see also Walsh). He says 
that he has been encouraged to write the novel by one of his school teachers, but adds that, as 
he only likes factual writing, he has decided to write an autobiographical account of his 
attempt to discover who killed his next-door neighbour’s dog, Wellington. He also spells out 
that he finds people “confusing” for two reasons: their tendency to communicate non-verbally 
(e.g. via facial expressions), and their tendency to use metaphors, which Christopher 
dismisses as “lies”. Indeed, Christopher also says that he never lies, and that he is unable to 
engage in small talk, or, as he puts it, “chatting”.  
 
The language Christopher uses, both as a narrator and as a character, provides the reader with 
additional clues on the distinctive way in which his mind works. His vocabulary arguably 
displays both what Fowler (Linguistic Criticism) calls “underlexicalization” and 
“overlexicalization”. Christopher mostly uses a simpler and more limited range of words than 
one would normally expect of an adolescent of his age (for example he does not know what 
“single” or “return” mean as descriptions of train tickets), but displays unusual lexical 
sophistication when he discusses the mathematical and scientific topics he is fond of. 
Similarly, the grammatical structures he uses tend to be fairly simple, except for some of the 
stretches of text where he deals with his favourite topics. As far as communication is 
concerned, it becomes clear at various points that Christopher is not able to lie strategically, 
and there are many occasions where, both as a narrator and as a character, he does not seem 
able to judge what amount of information is appropriate for his addressees, and hence 
provides too much or too little detail (in Grice’s terms, Christopher has trouble with the 
maxim of Quantity; see Semino “Mind Style 25 years on”). All this points in the direction of 
a “Theory of Mind” problem, which is associated with autistic-spectrum disorders: the 
inability to understand that others have mental states that are different from one’s own, and to 
attribute mental states to others on the basis of their behaviour (e.g. Baron-Cohen). Indeed, 
Christopher recounts how he failed a standard ‘Theory of Mind’ task when he first started 
school (Haddon 145). 
 
Some of the characteristics I have mentioned are evident in the passage below. Christopher’s 
next-door neighbour, Mrs Shears, has called the police after finding Christopher in her garden 
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in the early hours of the morning holding her dead dog, who has a garden fork sticking out of 
its body. In the extract Christopher describes the arrival of the police, and his conversation 
with a policeman: 
 
Then the police arrived. I like the police. They have uniforms and numbers and you 
know what they are meant to be doing. There was a policewoman and a policeman. 
The policewoman had a little hole in her tights on her left ankle and a red scratch in 
the middle of the hole. The policeman had a big orange leaf stuck to the bottom of his 
shoe which was poking out from one side. 
 The policewoman put her arms round Mrs Shears and led her back towards the 
house. 
 I lifted my head off the grass. 
 The policeman squatted down beside me and said, ‘Would you like to tell me 
what’s going on here, young man?’ 
I sat up and said, ‘The dog is dead.’ 
 ‘I’d got that far,’ he said. 
 I said, ‘I think someone killed the dog.’ 
 ‘How old are you?’ he asked. 
 I replied, ‘I am 15 years and 3 months and 2 days.’ 
 ‘And what, precisely, were you doing in the garden?’ he asked. 
 ‘I was holding the dog,’ I replied. 
 ‘And why were you holding the dog?’ he asked. 
 This was a difficult question. (Haddon 7) 
 
In the next section I show how some idiosyncrasies in Christopher’s use of (especially 
person) deixis contribute to the representation of the distinctive ways in which his mind 
works.   
 
Deixis in the novel 
In this section I begin by discussing the occasional failure, on Christopher’s part, to use  
anaphoric expressions where they would normally be expected. I then go on to consider the 




Anaphora is not, strictly speaking, a deictic phenomenon. However, there is no clearcut 
boundary between anaphoric references to previously mentioned entities on the one hand, and 
discourse deictic references to portions of the ongoing utterance or text on the other (e.g. see 
Levinson 85). Lyons, for example, states that “anaphora rests ultimately on deixis”, as the use 
of anaphoric expressions depends, in part, on how recently a particular referent has been 
mentioned, and “recency of mention is itself a deictically based notion” (Lyons 671). 
 
There are occasions in The Curious Incident where Christopher uses full noun phrases where 
anaphoric expressions would normally have been more appropriate. Consider the extract 
below, which is a description of the ticket hall of a railway station:  
 
And there was a long desk at the other side of the big room and a window on the desk 
and there was a man standing in front of the window and there was a man behind the 
window, and I said to the man behind the window, ‘I want to go to London.’ (Haddon 
188)  
 
The vocabulary used by Christopher in this extract is simpler and more generic than one may 
expect of a fifteen-year-old: expressions such as “big room” and “man behind the window” 
are used to describe entities for which more specific descriptions exist, such as “station 
foyer”  and “ticket seller”. This potentially creates an effect that has been discussed both in 
stylistics and narratology, whereby readers may initially have difficulties recognizing a 
situation they are in fact familiar with (e.g. see Fowler, Linguistic Criticism, Margolin). The 
grammatical structure of the sentence quoted above is also striking in its simplicity: the 
sentence consists of four clauses linked by “and”. This type of structure is more typical of 
speech than writing, and tends to be used in fiction to create the impression of child-like 
minds, as, for example, Benjy’s in The Sound and the Fury  (see Leech and Short 165). In 
addition, Christopher’s description contains much unnecessary repetition, as he repeats whole 
noun phrases where an anaphoric expression would normally be used. For example, the third 
instance of “window” in the extract above could have been replaced by “it”, and the second 
instance of “man behind the window” could have been replaced by “him”, or “the 
latter/second man”. This kind of phenomenon does not occur systematically throughout the 
novel, but, where it does occur, it gives Christopher’s prose a rather laboured feel, and 
reinforces the impression of his sense of alienation and processing difficulties in 




The most systematic and idiosyncratic patterns in the use of deixis in the novel, however, 
concern person deixis. A keyword analysis reveals that first-person singular pronouns are 
overused in the novel, while first-person plural pronouns are underused. More specifically, a 
comparison between the novel and the Imaginative Writing section of the BNC Sampler 
conducted by means of the Wmatrix online tool revealed that the subject pronoun “I” is the 
second top key word in the novel (after “and” and “because”): it occurs over 2,000 times in 
the approximately 62,000 word contained in novel. This result is statistically significant at 
99.99 per cent (p <  0.0001). Both “me” and “my” were also found to be overused in the 
same comparison, respectively at 99.99 per cent (p <  0.0001) and 99 per cent significance (p 
< 0.01).  
 
It could be objected that the high frequency of first-person pronouns in comparison with the 
Imaginative Writing section of the BNC Sampler could simply be due to the fact that The 
Curious Incident is a first-person narrative. However, “I” was revealed to be the third top key 
word even when the novel was compared with the 40,000-word corpus of first-person 20th 
century fiction created as part of the project discussed in Semino and Short. Even in this case, 
the level of significance was 99.99 per cent (p <  0.0001). “My” was also found to be 
overused in this second comparison, at a 99 per cent level of significance (p < 0.01). In other 
words, the frequency of first-person singular pronouns in Haddon’s novel is unusually high, 
even as compared with other examples of first-person fiction. This applies particularly clearly 
to the subject pronoun “I”. I would argue that this reflects Christopher’s tendency to be 
unusually focused on himself, and, more specifically, his own actions and thoughts, which 
may contribute to the impression that he has an autistic-spectrum disorder. In addition, his 
use of plural first-person pronouns suggests some degree of alienation from others. 
 
The comparison between The Curious Incident and the Imaginative Writing section of the 
BNC Sampler revealed that the pronoun “we” is the 23rd most underused word: it is used 
unusually infrequently in the novel as compared with the reference corpus, at a level of 
significance of 99.99 per cent (p <  0.0001). The corresponding object pronoun “us” and 
possessive determiner “our” are also underused, at a level of significance of 99.9 per cent (p 
< 0.001). “We”  and “our” were also found to be underused when the novel was compared 
with the first-person fiction corpus, at a level of significance of 99 per cent (p < 0.01). This 
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could be taken as an indication that Christopher’s sense of commonality with others is less 
evident in the novel than is the case in other fictional texts. 
 
An examination of a concordance of “we” in the novel revealed a further relevant pattern in 
Christopher’s use of this pronoun. Christopher almost exclusively uses “we” as the subject of  
verbs indicating what Halliday (Functional Grammar) calls “material processes”, namely 
verbs evoking physical actions, such as “we drove off”, “we went for a walk”. Conversely, 
Christopher does not use expressions such as “we felt”, “we decided”, “we thought”: he does 
not use “we” as the subject of verbs indicating what Halliday (Functional Grammar) calls 
“mental processes”, namely verbs evoking cognitive and emotional states and changes. The 
only exception to this pattern are cases of the “generic” use of “we” to refer to people 
generally, which Christopher primarily employs when discussing knowledge about scientific 
topics, as in “because when we look up into the sky at night there will be no darkness”. In 
contrast, the first-person fiction corpus (which, it should be noted, is smaller in terms of word 
count than The Curious Incident) contains expressions such as: “But we still love the place 
for itself”, “the experience we had shared”, “I think we liked it that way because both of us 
had a feeling that the meetings should be something of a secret”. In Palmer’s (Fictional 
Minds) terms, these kinds of expressions are one of the textual indicators of “intermentality”, 
the attribution of shared internal states to groups consisting of more than one person, or, in 
this case, of groups consisting of the speaker/narrator and at least one other person. The fact 
that this form of intermentality does not seem to occur in Christopher’s narrative can be seen 
as one of the ways in which the novel suggests that Christopher has a “Theory of Mind” 
problem: he does not tend to talk about shared mental states with others because he does not 
have a fully developed ability to understand the workings of others’ minds. 
 
In this context, the few occasions in which Christopher suggests some form of intermental 
activity involving himself and another character are particularly foregrounded. The following 
example occurs just after Christopher has been collected by his father from the police station 
where he was taken after hitting the policeman who appears in the extract I quoted above. 
 
I stepped outside. Father was standing in the corridor. He held up his right 
hand and spread his fingers out in a fan. I held up my left hand and spread my fingers 
out in a fan and we made our fingers and thumbs touch each other. We do this 
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because sometimes Father wants to give me a hug, but I do not like hugging people, 
so we do this instead, and it means that he loves me. (Haddon 21) 
 
Here Christopher explains his own and his father’s behaviour in terms of a shared 
understanding of each others’ preferences and emotions (cf. “we do it because”). However, 
this behaviour is clearly not the spontaneous outcome of mutual understanding, but rather the 
result of an explicit agreement on how to achieve some degree of physical intimacy with 
Christopher in spite of his aversion to bodily contact. 
 
A further set of comparisons by means of the keyword tool in Wmatrix was carried out in 
order to exclude the possibility that the quantitative results I have presented were unduly 
influenced by the presence of other characters’ voices within Christopher’s narrative. I 
created an electronic version of the novel which excluded all instances of direct speech 
presentation of utterances produced by characters other than Christopher himself. I then 
repeated the comparisons mentioned above. All results were confirmed as statistically 
significant at similar levels, with the exception of “me”, which was not found to be overused 
in the “Christopher only” version of the novel as compared with the Imaginative Writing 
section of the BNC sampler. In fact, as suggested earlier, “me” was not found to be overused 
in the complete novel as compared with the first-person fiction corpus even in my first set of 
comparisons, in contrast with “I” and “my”, which turn out to be overused in all the 
comparisons I have conducted. This suggests that Christopher tends to talk unusually 
frequently about what he does and thinks, rather than about how other people affect him.  
 
The results obtained when comparing the “Christopher only” version with the two reference 
corpora revealed a further potentially relevant pattern in Christopher’s use of person deixis 
that was not equally prominent when considering the novel as a whole. This pattern concerns 
the use of second-person pronouns in The Curious Incident. The reflexive second-person 
pronoun “yourself” is underused in the whole novel as compared with the Imaginative 
Writing section of the BNC Sampler, at a level of statistical significance of 99 per cent (p < 
0.01), while “you” is underused in the whole novel as compared with the first-person fiction 
corpus at a level of statistical significance of 99.99 per cent (p < 0.0001). When the same 
comparisons were carried out with the “Christopher only” version of the novel, the underuse 
of second-person pronouns turned out to be more marked. The comparison with the 
Imaginative Writing section of the BNC sampler revealed that “you”, “your” and “yourself” 
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are underused, at a level of statistical significance of 99.99 per cent for “you” and “your” (p < 
0.0001), and 99 per cent for “yourself” (p < 0.01). “You” and “your” were also found to be 
underused in the “Christopher only” version of the novel as compared with the first-person 
fiction corpus, at a level of statistical significance of 99 per cent (p < 0.01). In other words, 
Christopher’s narrative, including his direct speech, seem to contain an unusually low 
frequency of references to an addressee.  
 
An examination of the concordances for “you” and “your” in the “Christopher only” version 
of the novel provides further insights into Christopher’s distinctive use of second-person 
pronouns. The vast majority of Christopher’s uses of “you” and “your” occur in narration 
rather than direct speech, and are best described as instances of the “generic” use of the 
second-person pronoun to refer to people in general, as I noted above in relation to some 
instances of “we”. This is the case, for example, in “It was a clear night and you could see the 
Milky Way”, and “in this experiment you put your head in a clamp”. Only 18 instances of 
“you” (out of a total of 321) and one instance of “your” (out of 35) occur in direct speech 
reports of Christopher’s utterances, and hence function as deictic references to another 
participant in communication (e.g. “I said, ‘But  you  can’t cook.’”). In other words, most of 
the utterances that Christopher attributes to himself do not include deictic references to his 
addressee(s) by means of second-person pronouns, as he does not tend to comment on or 
inquire about his interlocutors. This may further contribute to the impression that he is 
unusually self-focused, and that he has little awareness of others’ mental states.   
 
Overall, I would argue that, in The Curious Incident, the combination of overuse of singular 
first-person pronouns and underuse of both plural first-person pronouns and second-person 
pronouns contributes to create an impression of the particular kind of egocentricity that 
characterizes Christopher. He is a loner, and tends to be content in his own company. He also 
has difficulties understanding the mental states of others, and seldom feels a sense of affinity 
and commonality with them. This is consistent with the attribution to Christopher of a high-




In this essay I have suggested that idiosyncratic patterns in the use of deixis can be exploited 
in literature to contribute to the impression of fictional minds that work in “unorthodox”  or 
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“nonstandard” ways. The notion of “egocentricity”, which captures the fact that the default 
deictic centre is the speaker’s or writer’s current position, can be applied in its more general, 
non-technical sense to the effects of unusually frequent occurrences of proximal deictics in 
first-person fiction. In both of the texts I have discussed, the speaker/narrator can be 
described as strikingly self-focused, and as not fully able to appreciate the minds and 
perspectives of others. However, the discussion has also shown that the particular 
peculiarities in the use of deictic expressions in individual texts can be associated with 
further, more specific effects, such as the wodwo’s exclusive concentration on the here-and-
now, which does not apply to the narrator in The Curious Incident. I have also shown how the 
use of corpus-based methods to compare individual texts with relevant larger corpora can 
provide quantitative support for claims about unusual frequencies of particular linguistic 
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